This article accepts the dependency school's emphasis on the importance of analysing characteristics of the international capitalist system when seeking to understand the causes of underdevelopment see Palma 1978! rather than focusing mainly on conditions within a peripheral economy in isolation. Starting with some consideration of certain features of the world capitalist system we can suggest the sort of general limitations one would expect to find on late industrial development in any peripheral economy trading freely with developed industrial countries. We can then go on to examine the experience of industry in the Republic of Ireland in the light of these expectations.
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Developed Capitalism and Peripheral Industry As Bienefeld and Innes 11976! argue, established industries based in the developed economies have great competitive advantages over the relative newcomers in the periphery; these advantages, they say, derive from long-accumulated resources of capital, proprietary technology, large established markets, managerial skills and political influence. To these factors may be added the advantages inherent in an established industrial economy which derive from the external economies of large industrial centres. All these factors combine to give established producers based in industrialised economies competitive advantages in most sectors of industry over newcomers in peripheral economies.
These competitive advantages are very important in practice because of the world economy's history of recurring depressions and persistent underemployment of productive resources in the periphery, which means that available markets tend to be relatively limited when measured against supplies of productive resources, and that competition for these markets is intense. In these conditions, the large established industries based in the developed economies are able to dominate international markets in most sectors, at the expense of newcomers in the periphery, so that most industrial production remains concentrated in the developed countries. The peripheral economies generally find it very difficult to gain international markets for most industrial products, apart from a very limited range of sectors.
The argument above does not completely rule out the possibility of private indigenous industrial development 42 in peripheral economies trading freely with core industrial countries, but it does suggest that such development will necessarily be very limited. But in certain industries where the factors giving rise to established industry competitive advantage are not of great importance, real opportunities exist for indigenous enterprises in the periphery to compete effectively in international markets. Also, perhaps more commonly. in cases where these factors give established producers only quite small advantages which can be offset by transport costs or the advantages of proximity. indigenous enterprises in the periphery may be able to compete effectively in the domestic market.
These considerations suggest that the type of indigenous exporting industries one could expect to find in a lateindustrialising peripheral economy would be industries using relatively simple or standardised mature technology which can be readily purchased, and having one or more of the following characteristics: labour intensity.
local craft intensity, a low modern industrial skill content, or low value added to local primary resources.
In addition, in most cases, a fairly small scale and limited fixed assets would be expected. Indigenous industries oriented to the unprotected home market could also include other products with a low value/bulk ratio, such as building materials, and sectors where close regular contact with the local market is important, such as printing, packaging and building. lt is important.
however, in considering these opportunities for indigenous industry in the periphery, to note that they are quite limited. There is no necessary reason why the scope for industrialisation in sectors such as these should be sufficient for all available resources of either capital or labour to find employment within a late-industrialising peripheral economy under a free trade.
Under a protectionist policy, the scope for indigenous industrialisation in the periphery widens to include other sectors which do not have a genuine competitive advantage; the first to benefit would be those most similar in character to the peripheral industries (outlined above), and it would commonly include the final stages of pmduction or assembly of previously imported goods for the local market in order to avoid the tariff barriers. Some of the 'infant industries' established behind protective barriers could prove viable after a return to free trade, but the gap between the developed industrial economies and the periphery in the twentieth century seems to be such that relatively few protected 'infant industries' or 'infant economies' prove capable of significantly expanding manufactured exportsan indication that a true competitive advantage has developed. The failure to develop exports combined with rising imports of industrial inputs is a major cause of the balance of payments difficulties which generally afflict protected peripheral economies.
In some countries, however (Japan is the main example), where the state has taken up a very active and direct by the standards of most European countries with the major exception of Britain, the pioneer of the industrial revolution. As late as the census of 1841, for example, 700,000 people almost one quarter of those gainfully occupiedreported that they were occupied in textile manufacturing [Cullen 1968J . But during the nineteenth century industrial employment declined rapidly, except in the north-eastern region around Belfast, offering diminishing prospects of employment to the masses being squeezed out of agriculture. Consequently, emigration rose to proportions unparelled in any other country. reducing the labour force of the area which is today the Republic of Ireland from 3mn in 1841 to just by then only about 100,000 workers (7 per cent of the labour force) were employed ¡n industry.
The most convincing explanation of the industrial The government appointed Committee on Industrial Organisation found that most manufacturing concerns in the early 1960s were producing very largely for the protected domestic market and consequently were small in scale and had a considerable variety of products with short production runs and high unit costs. Mainly because of the small scale and the assembly type nature of many of the operations, the technology in use was rarely developed by the firms themselves and was rarely the most advanced. Also, compared with other European countries, expenditure on industrial research and development was very low I see Cooper and Whelan 19731. The fact that many industries were not prepared to face free trade in the early l9& was officially recognised, but it was expected, in line with much orthodox' academic thinking on economic development, that the pressures of competition would improve efficiency and promote more specialised, larger scale, technically advanced production for larger markets. It was anticipated therefore, that after some restructuring, although some industries might suffer, many would face improved prospects for growth under free trade. Adaptation Councils were instituted for each of 24 industrial sectors to prepare for free trade by promoting cooperation in purchasing materials, marketing, choosing areas of specialisation, eliminating uncompetitive product lines and organising amalgamations of small firms.
Adaptation Grants of up to 25 per cent of restructuring costs were made available, along with other forms of assistance, and by 1968 it was reported that such grants had been approved for firms accounting for at least 75 per cent of manufacturing output and employment.
Thus the move to free trade was well prepared and apparently supported by respectable theory. Tariff cuts were implemented very gradually over the 10 years 1%5-75 in the case of British goods, and the S years 1973-78 in the case of products from the EEC; the move was not sudden. And yet the signs to date are that most of Irish industry not only failed to benefit from free trade, but has actually suffered noticeably. Between 1965 and 1971 the rate of redundancies in existing industry rose from 700 to 5,000 pa, and in the four years 1973-76 it is estimated that about 50,000 jobs (about one quarter of the manufacturing labour force) were permanently lost. Employment in the older, formerly protected industries has shown a net decline since 1960, although their output has grown somewhat as the domestic market has grown; significantly, too, the proportion of output exported by these industries did not increase, but rather declined slightly, between 1960 and 1973 I McAleese 19781. Thus, up to 1973 at leastand probably up to the present, the benefits of free trade suggested by the architects of the outward-looking policies have not materialised in the older, formerly protected industries. Instead, many of them closed down, while most have so far proved viable only after considerable defensive investment which was associated with losses of employment and a shrinking share of a growing home market. It was in fact officially observed during the 1960s that investment in adaptation for free trade was mostly not of the type desired; it was going mainly to increasing productive efficiency in existing activities rather than to basic restructuring involving larger scale more specialised activities with an export orientation see NIEC 19681. There was a strong tendency to attribute this failure mainly to poor entrepreneurship, but such an explanation seems rather weak compared with a more plausible alternative view.
As suggested earlier, the longer established industries of the developed industrial economies have great competitive advantages over small, technologically weak industries in peripheral economies, such as those developed in the Republic of Ireland up to the 1960s. Since it is the aim of the private entrepreneur to seek out opportunities for profitable investment, it is scarcely an indication of incompetence or excessive caution if he shrinks from trying to build up large specialised export-oriented industries in such circumstances. Once the intensity of competition from developed industrial economies is fully appreciated. the Irish entrepreneurs' decision to engage in purely defensive investment to protect their existing enterprises. and probably also to invest more in non-manufacturing sectors, seems unsurprising. For, in a highly competitive environment, control of large established markets seems a necessity for motivating large investments in research, development and production of advanced specialised industrial productsif the motive is private profit within a reasonable time span. On the other hand, ownership of specialised technology and large productive facilities is necessary to control large markets.
Consequently, the small, technologically weak newcomer with small market shares faces great difficulty in breaking into international markets in most sectors. Such a view of the wide and persistent gap between the industrial potential of established industrial economies and aspiring late developers seems consistent with the experience of Irish industryL, the view that favourable local conditions in a peripheral economy. combined with market forces, can lead to continuing development until the less developed country evolves into a developed one does not seem so.
Some suggestions were made above concerning the nature of the limited range of industries which could prove viable for indigenous private enterprise in a peripheral economy trading freely with developed To focus particularly on new (ie post-l950s) Irish industries, food processing is the dominant activity among enterprises employing over 50 workers, while the smaller ones have a more diverse range of activities including some branches of engineering and electronics. However, these small industries appear to be generally confined to relatively labour intensive activities using simple technology. at present to a limited range of products with little potential for diversification. The potential for its expansion is limited by demand, particularly in the home market, rather than by the availability of capital for investment in increased capacity. This is supported by a lack of any evidence, despite the efforts of some studies, of a causal link between increases in industrial profits and subsequent growth of industrial investment and output. Growth of output has, however, been related to growth of home demand. Furthermore, there appears to be a growing tendency, which has been little studied, for large Irish industrial companies to invest their profits in non-industrial sectors and in acquisitions of foreign companies rather than in expansion and diversification of their manufacturing activities in Ireland. Again, this would suggest that the potential for indigenous Irish industrial diversification and expansion is limited.
ConcIuson lt seems likely, in view of the many different social formations in different countries, that the dependency approach to understanding peripheral societies will remain a broad approach rather than a formal theory. This paper, however, has suggested that a similar set of constraints may serve to limit the possibilities of indigenous private industrial development in all latedeveloping peripheral economies which trade freely with developed industrial countries, and that, in view of the competitive advantages of established industrial producers, indigenous industries would tend to be limited to sectors using simple. or standardised mature 46 technology, and having characteristics such as labour intensity, local craft intensity, low value added to local primary resources, low value/bulk ratio and clear advantages arising from close regular contact with the local market. In the Republic of Ireland, sectors such as these are quite well develqped mainly by indigenous enterprises which do not seem capable of much further diversification despite the availability of capital and labour and free access to large markets.
The long experience of the decline of Irish industry under free trade during the century before the 1930sapparently because of growing competition from British industries which were gaining increasing advantages arising from developing economies of scale, external economies, specialised skills and technology and proximity to the major growing marketssupports the general view that conditions have developed over a long period of time which give the earliest established industrial economies substantial competitive advantages over the relatively small and weak industries of peripheral economies aspiring to late development.
The main strategic options for late industrialisation now seems to focus either on some form of sustained protection or on very substantial activity by the state in the interests of the long term development of specialised technology, skills and productive facilities which could eventually result in wider areas of genuine competitive advantage under free trade. The protectionist option depends heavily on a country's ability to overcome the balance of payments constraint in the face of rising imports of industrial inputs such as materials, capital equipment and technology, which cannot possibly be produced domestically for long.
For most countries, apart from those with particularly valuable natural resources, this means that exports of industrial products must be expanded eventually here again. co-ordinated intervention by the state to attain long term development goals seems essential. The viability of either of these options therefore ultimately depends on which social classes control or influence state power. and to what purpose.
note: the more general dependency references are not given here but in the bibliography at the end of this Bulletin.
